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Abstract
1
  
 
As the distinction between personal and organizational device usage continues to blur, the combination of 
applications that interact increases the need to investigate potential security issues. Although security and 
forensic researchers have been able to recover a variety of artifacts, empirical research has not examined a 
suite of application artifacts from the perspective of high-level pattern identification. This research 
presents a preliminary investigation into the idea that residual artifacts generated by cloud-based 
synchronized applications can be used to identify broad user behavior patterns. To accomplish this, the 
researchers conducted a single-case, pretest-posttest, quasi experiment using a smartphone device and a 
suite of Google mobile applications. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it provides a proof 
of concept of the extent to which residual data from cloud-based synchronized applications can be used to 
broadly identify user behavior patterns from device data patterns. Second, it highlights the need for 
security controls to prevent and manage information flow between BYOD mobile devices and cloud 
synchronization services. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile devices are integrating into increasingly globally transparent business infrastructures. Gartner 
predicts that, by 2016, 40 percent of the workforce will be mobile and that the majority of them will 
possess a smartphone (Gartner, 2012). This evolution potentially impacts a range of business strategies 
that include network security, device and application development, and data management.   
Hence, organizations are investigating various ideas to extend existing information technology 
infrastructures to include mobile devices (Scheepers & Scheepers, 2004). One possible solution is the 
implementation of a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) program. BYOD programs potentially offer 
several benefits that include an increased level of productivity, mobile device procurement and 
maintenance cost reduction, increased workforce mobility, location flexibility, increased accessibility and 
longer working hours (Copeland & Crespi, 2012; Scarfo, 2012).  
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In addition to corporate environments, governments are embracing BYOD programs. Forrester Research 
(2012) found that 59% of smartphones connected to various government networks were personally-owned 
devices. TrendMicro (2012) reports that security vulnerabilities found in legitimate smartphone 
applications can make the extraction of personal and corporate data much easier for cybercriminals. 
Hence, there are growing concerns that the amount of business and personal information collected by 
mobile applications could lead to increased end-user profiling (Cleff, 2007). These concerns prompted the 
research question: 
Is it possible to recover residual data from a reset, resynchronized mobile device running a suite of 
cloud-based synchronized apps to identify the device user’s daily behavioral patterns, social activities, 
and relationships with other individuals? 
The contribution of answering this question is two-fold. First, it provides a proof of concept that data 
recovered from cloud-based synchronized applications on a reset, resynchronized mobile device can be 
used to identify user behavior patterns. Second, it highlights the need for security controls to prevent and 
manage information flow between BYOD mobile devices and cloud synchronization services.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two discusses related work concerning smartphone security 
and privacy. Section three presents the methodology and summarizes recovered artifacts. Section four 
discusses the results. Section five draws conclusions and presents future work. 
2.  RELATED WORK 
Smartphone privacy and security have attracted considerable attention from various aspects of academia. 
Researchers have used a number of methods to assess and understand the risks associated with storing 
personal information on these devices. Warden and Allen (2011) demonstrated how Apple mobile devices 
collected and stored location information such as mobile cell towers and Wi-Fi access points. Although 
no personal information was being recorded, Warden and Allen (2011) argued that should an Apple 
mobile device be stolen and jail-broken, cybercriminals could easily access and identify previous device 
owner whereabouts. 
The security and privacy of Android devices and applications have also come under scrutiny. TaintDroid 
(Enck, Gilbert, Chun, Cox, Jung, McDaniel, & Sheth, 2010) was developed to dynamically track the flow 
of private information through third-party applications installed on an Android device. Enck, et al. (2010) 
tested thirty random applications with the primary objective of analyzing data leakage from both a 
privacy and a security perspective. Over one-half the tested applications were reported to be transmitting 
user location and device information to remote services. Similarly, Gibler, et al. (2012) presented 
AndroidLeaks which performed a static analysis of code to identify data leakage from Android 
applications. A third of the 24,000 applications tested were found to store and leak private information 
such as the device location, Wi-Fi data and audio conversations. Although the authors of TaintDroid and 
AndroidLeaks have highlighted the amount of personal information being stored and leaked by Android 
applications, neither author’s research focused on assimilating collected information to establish data 
patterns. 
The literature indicates that many researchers focus on the impact of mobile privacy and security from the 
perspective of individuals and not from the perspective of an organization (Glisson & Storer, 2013). 
Glisson and Storer (2013) did investigate mobile devices from an organizational privacy and security 
viewpoint. In terms of organizational security, mobile devices which utilize location and cloud 
synchronization services are at risk for targeted attacks and can introduce the potential for data leakage 
within an organization (Grispos, Glisson, & Storer, 2013; Keyes, 2013). Keyes (2013) indicates there is 
the potential for attackers to use location services to determine where the device owner is located at a 
specific time, to correlate this information with other sources, to establish associates and provide an 
  
indication of the kinds of activities performed in specific locations. However, Keyes does not elaborate on 
how this information can be extracted by attackers or evaluate any methods for performing this attack. 
Miller, et. al., (2012) notes that in a BYOD scenario location, and synchronization services can 
complicate security issues for an organization. Grispos, et al., (2013) highlighted the technical 
opportunities for accessing data stored on cloud synchronization services, such as Box, via residual data 
stored on a mobile device. In corporate environments, the literature identifies security issues related to 
BYOD solutions as originating from a lack of end-user device controls coupled with a blurring of the 
distinction between personal and work-related data (Glisson & Storer, 2013; Scarfo, 2012). 
Harris, et. al., (2013) conducted a survey with college students, who were about to enter the workforce, to 
determine their attitudes towards BYOD security. The results from the survey indicated that there is a 
lack of security awareness from the participants towards BYOD. Twenty percent of the participants 
admitted that they ‘root’ or ‘jailbreak’ their mobile device, potentially creating a major security risk for 
organizations that would accept these devices on their networks (Harris, et al., 2013). Although 
researchers have highlighted the security risks of mobile applications in a BYOD context, empirical 
research has not examined a suite of application artifacts from the perspective of device data pattern 
identification. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In order to test the research question of this study, two hypotheses were formulated. 
H1: Residual data can be recovered from a reset, resynchronized smartphone device that is using cloud-
based synchronized applications. 
H2: Residual data recovered from a reset, resynchronized smartphone is sufficient to correlate device data 
patterns with known device user behavior patterns. 
For the purpose of this research, user behavior patterns are broadly defined as an individual’s daily 
behavioral characteristics, social activities and relationships with other individuals using electronic 
devices.  
3.1 Experimental Design 
The experimental design employed in this study is the Single Case Pretest-Posttest Quasi Experiment 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The primary characteristic of a quasi-experiment is the lack of 
randomization. In a single case design, there is one subject (in this case a smartphone device) that 
undergoes a measurement, a treatment, and a measurement (O1 X O2) or pretest-treatment-posttest.  
The smartphone device used in the pretest-posttest quasi experiment is an HTC One X with 3G data 
services. An HTC Desire was used in the post-hoc experiment to measure residual data captured from a 
secondary device. Table 1 – Smartphone device features, highlights the notable features of these devices. 
The two smartphones selected in this experiment were chosen for their operating systems. The Operating 
System (OS) for the HTC One X was a recent version at the time of the experiment. This created 
compatibility issues with ‘push-button’ forensics solutions. Lack of compatibility forces investigators to 
use more traditional software development tools. The OS for the HTC Desire represents an older version 
of Android that is compatible with ‘push-button’ solutions. This allows for an initial assessment of the 
output from each approach. 
It should be noted that the scope of the quasi experiment was limited in the following ways. The HTC 
One X smartphone was rooted prior to being used. This experiment was conducted in the United 
Kingdom using Global System of Mobile Communications technology. The experiment focused on a 
specific version of the Android operating system and specific versions of Google applications. The HTC 
  
One X solely utilized the Android Debug Bridge for data extraction. The password for the resynchronized 
smartphone is presumed to be known. The password to the account is not the focus or the research. This is 
due to legislation that requires suspects to provide this password and encryption information like the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 in the United Kingdom (UK Parliament, 2000) and 
companies retaining ownership and rights to devices. The emphasis on passwords is further diminished 
when considered in conjunction with individuals commonly reusing small sets of passwords and current 
research into resolving this information (Das, Bonneau, Caesar, Borisov, & Wang, 2014; Stobert, 2014).  
Feature HTC One X HTC Desire 
Operating System Android 4.0 (Ice Cream) Android 2.1 (Éclair) 
RAM 1 GB 567 MB 
Internal Memory 32 GB Storage 512 MB ROM 
Memory Card No (Virtual SD Card) Yes (4 GB) 
Table 1. Smartphone Device Features 
The applications included in this experiment were official Google applications that are compatible with 
the Android operating system v4.0. The Google applications selected for inclusion in this experiment are: 
Google+ (version 4.0.0.46852618); Google Search (version 1.4.1.278776); Google Calendar (version 
201305280); Google Tracks (version 2.0.4); Google Maps (version 6.14.4); Google Drive (version 
1.2.182.26); Google Keep (version 1.0.79); and Gmail (version 4.3.1).  
It is submitted that the phone used in this experiment is representative of all phones of identical make, 
model, and configuration. The O1 instance of our design serves as the experimental “control” and is 
referred to as “Image 1”. Image 1 contains the forensically recovered residual data prior to the treatment, 
the pretest. The treatment is a hard-reset of the device, formatting of the memory card, and a re-synch of 
the device with the cloud-based apps. The posttest is the recovery of residual data after the treatment and 
is referred to as “Image 2”. Consistent with our research question and hypotheses, the posttest examines 
the casual impact of the treatment (X) on the amount of forensically recoverable data on the device (O1). 
A post-hoc forensics test was conducted on a secondary device not included in the control (O1). The 
results of this test are referred to as “Image 3”. 
3.2 Pretest 
The following steps describe how the device was tested for residual data prior to treatment. The residual 
data forensically recovered from the device serves as the control or baseline against which the posttest 
results were compared.  
1. The HTC One X smartphone’s boot-loader was unlocked using the steps on the HTC website (2013) 
and then the device was ‘rooted’ using a method described on the CNET website (Griffin, 2012).  
2. A desktop computer was used to create a Google account. 
3. After the Google account was created, Google contacts were accessed through a desktop web browser 
to store information for fifteen individuals. The contact information included: first name, last name, 
mobile phone number and email address.  
4. The smartphone device was powered on and the Google account was used to sign-on to Google 
Services during the initial device setup. An automatic sync with the Google Cloud and the option to 
allow Google to use location services were also selected during the setup. The device was then 
configured to use the 3G data services to gain access to the Internet. 
  
5. After the device setup was completed, the Google applications were downloaded and installed using 
the default installation parameters from the Google Play market. 
6. The applications were executed and the test account was used to sign-in to various Google services.  
7. Applications were used over a two-week period. Table 2 – Daily Activities presents the activities 
performed and when they were specifically repeated for each application. Table 3 – Other Activities 
defines application activities performed on varied days and at varied times. A total of 212 activities 
were performed using the device which included 58 activities from Table 2 – Daily Activities and 154 
activities from Table 3 – Other Activities.  
Occurrence Activity Activity Count 
Monday – Friday 
9am-10:30am 
Google+ Check-in: Kelvin Hall Subway – “Off to 
Work” 
10 
Monday – Friday 
10am-11:30am 
Google Search: “Starbucks Near Me” and Check-in: 
“Starbucks Coffee” 
20 
Monday – Friday 
6pm-8pm 
Check-in, Google Tracks: Go for a jog along either 
University Avenue or Kelvin Way (alternative days) to 
Home 
10 
Tuesday or Friday 
8pm-9pm 
Google Search, Check-in: Chinese or Indian Restaurant 4 
Monday – Friday 
11am-12pm 
Google Search: “What’s the weather like tomorrow?” 10 
Saturday and 
Sunday  
9am-11am 
Google+ Check-in: “At home” 4 
Total Daily Activities 58 
Table 2. Daily Activities 
8. Upon completion of the two week period, artifacts associated with the suite of Google applications 
were extracted using Android Debug Bridge (ADB). USB debugging was activated on the device and 
the ADB was used to access the shell command prompt. The Android OS traditionally stores 
application-related artifacts in the /data/data folder on the User partition (Hoog, 2011). The contents 
of this folder were copied to a folder on the virtual memory card using the ADB. The virtual memory 
card was accessed using a write blocker via a desktop computer and a forensic image (Image 1) was 
created using FTK Imager (AccessData, 2008). 
3.3 Treatment 
The treatment involved the three-step process described below. 
1. The HTC One X device was hard-reset and the virtual memory card formatted.  
2. The HTC One X device was powered on and the artifact collection process, described in Step 8, was 
repeated to create a copy of the /data/data folder on the device. This step was implemented to verify 
that data, related to the Google applications, was no longer on the device.  
3. The test account was then used to sign-in to Google services and the applications used in the 
experiment were reinstalled. The HTC One X device and the applications were allowed to 
synchronize with the Google Cloud. 
 
  
3.4 Post-test 
The purpose of the posttest is to measure the degree to which re-synchronizing a wiped reset device (O2) 
to the cloud-based apps results in recoverable residual data. Image 2 was produced by repeating the 
process described in Step 8. 
3.5 Post-hoc Test 
A post-hoc test was conducted on O1, independent of the influence of the treatment (X), by introducing a 
secondary device. The purpose was to test the degree to which it was possible to recover residual data 
from O1 with a secondary device while the O1 device was still connected to the cloud-based apps.  
The secondary device, an HTC Desire smartphone, was used to sign-in to the Google account using 
Google services and the applications used in the experiment were installed. This device was allowed to 
synchronize with the data stored in the Google Cloud. After the synchronization was completed, this 
device was processed using Cellebrite UFED (version 1.8.5.0). The result of this processing was Image 3. 
All three forensic images were examined using Physical Analyzer (version 3.7.0.352) and AccessData 
Forensic Toolkit 4. 
Application Activity 
Activity 
Count 
Google+ 
Posted message on wall; posted on friend’s wall; friends posted on wall; 
sent and received messages; check-in locations; joined, viewed Google+ 
communities; deleted wall posts, check-ins, messages and left 
communities. 
81 
Google+ Hangouts Conducted a ‘Hangout’ 8 
Google Search Performed searches using typed and voice features. 10 
Google Calendar Added and deleted entries to calendar. 7 
Google Tracks ‘Tracked’ jogging activities. 4 
Google Maps Requested directions to locations; used Navigation feature for travel. 15 
Google Drive 
Saved two XLSX spreadsheet files, two PDF files, and two JPEG 
images to Drive; deleted PDF files after viewing on the device. 
6 
Google Keep Saved and deleted Notes. 11 
Gmail Sent and received emails. 12 
Total Other Activities  154 
Table 3. Other Activities 
Artifacts related to the pretest activities performed using the Google applications listed in Table 2 – Daily 
activities, were all recovered from Image 1 (O1). All of these artifacts contained timestamp information 
which matched the date and time the activity took place. The artifacts recovered included Google+ check-
in information, posts and messages, as well as Google Search results. One hundred and fifteen (74.6%) 
out of the 154 artifacts related to the activities in Table 3 – Other activities were also recovered from 
Image 1.  
4. ARTIFACTS RECOVERED 
It is interesting to note that no artifacts related to Google+ Hangouts were recovered from Image 1. In 
addition, events or files which were deleted during the experiment were also not recovered from the 
device. A total of 173 (81.6%) out of 212 activities were found on Image 1. In addition, all fifteen 
contacts stored in the Google Cloud were also recovered. 
The posttest results show that after the HTC One X was hard-reset to factory settings and then re-synched 
with the Google Cloud, a total of 83 (39%) out of 212 activity artifacts were recovered from Image 2 
  
(O2). The artifacts recovered included 35 artifacts (60%) from Table 2 and 48 artifacts (31%) from Table 
3.  All fifteen contacts stored in the Google Cloud were recovered from Image 2.   
In the post-hoc test, artifacts related to the Google applications were recovered from the HTC Desire 
which was synchronized with the Google account. In total, 84 (39.6%) out of 212 activity artifacts were 
recovered from Image 3. The artifacts recovered included 36 (62%) out of 58 from Table 2 and 48 (31%) 
out of 154 from Table 3. Although the number of artifacts recovered from the Desire and the HTC One X 
after the resynchronization are similar, different artifacts were recovered from each device. For example, 
no Google Keep artifacts were recovered from the HTC Desire but they were recovered from the second 
image of the HTC One X. All fifteen contacts stored in the Google Cloud were recovered from Image 3. 
Table 4 – Activity Artifacts Recovered summarizes the number of artifacts recovered from each device 
image for the pretest, posttest, and post-hoc test, as well as providing examples of metadata recovered 
from each application.  
Application  
(Real Activity Count) 
Metadata Recovered 
Pretest 
(Image 1) 
Post-test 
(Image 2) 
Post-hoc 
(Image 3) 
Google+ Activities 
(105) 
Timestamps; wall posts; 
comments; check-in and geo-
location points; community 
feeds and conversations; 
private messages sent and 
received; message author 
information. 
88 50 47 
Google+ Hangouts (8) - 0 0 0 
Google Search (34) 
Timestamps; search terms, 
Google URL; and number of 
visits. 
34 0 0 
Google Calendar (7) 
Appointment: title, location, 
start and end time and creation 
date and time.  
4 4 4 
Google Tracks (14) 
Timestamps; geo-location 
points; journey coordinates; 
and Keyhole Markup 
Language files. 
14 14 13 
Google Maps (15) 
Destination information 
requested; longitude and 
latitude coordinates; and 
request time. 
12 0 5 
Google Drive (6) 
Timestamps; Favorite files; 
storage service metadata; files 
viewed on the device and 
saved for offline viewing.  
6 0 6 
Google Keep (11) 
Notes created; creation and 
last modified times.  
5 5 0 
Gmail (12) 
Email body and subject; sent 
and received email addresses; 
email sent/received date and 
time. 
10 10 9 
Total (212)  173  83 84 
Table 4. Activity Artifacts Recovered 
  
5. DISCUSSION  
The results of this quasi-experiment are discussed from three perspectives: digital forensics; Bring Your 
Own Device (BYOD); and high-level device data patterns. 
5.1 Digital Forensics 
The Google artifacts recovered from the device can be used to either confirm or refute the events already 
discovered from other sources or storage media. Therefore, the evidence recovered from the Google 
applications can be used to validate or refute a portion of the device owner’s social behavior. 
Furthermore, the Google artifacts recovered can also be correlated with physical evidence to link 
individuals to certain events, for example, using the check-in data recovered from Google+ with CCTV 
footage from the related area (Carrier & Spafford, 2003).  
From an investigative perspective, there is the potential to use the artifacts recovered to develop social 
relationship profiles of suspects. Voigt, et al. (2013) reported how law enforcement agencies in Germany 
are using social networking sites such as Facebook and Google+ to locate personal information and social 
relationship profiles of suspects. This usually involves police officers befriending suspects on the social 
network using ‘fake’ accounts and then examining the social life of the person in question (Voigt, et al., 
2013). 
Alternatively, law enforcement agencies have also used a social network ‘crawler’ to identify and analyze 
these relationships (Voigt, et al., 2013). Although these approaches have not been declared illegal, Voigt, 
et al. state that evidence gathered using these methods may be inadmissible as evidence in court (Voigt, et 
al., 2013). The Google artifacts recovered from the experiment in this paper could be considered as an 
alternative source by law enforcement to identify a suspect’s social relationship with other individuals. 
The Google+ check-ins, posts, messages and pictures, as well as Gmail messages and Google Map 
locations could all be used to provide investigators with a more complete representation of activities.  
5.2 BYOD 
The implementation of BYOD programs in an organization leads to a potential situation where the 
boundaries become increasingly blurred between personal and corporate data. In a BYOD environment it 
is plausible that a personally-owned device could be accessing corporate data while interacting with cloud 
synchronization services (Morrow, 2012). This presents an opportunity for a malicious insider to use 
these services to steal corporate data and save it in cloud storage services such as Dropbox (Morrow, 
2012). This scenario recently resulted in IBM restricting its workforce from using cloud services, as well 
as Siri, Apple’s personal assistant (Leyden, 2012). The results of this experiment further highlight the 
potential risk that cloud synchronization applications can introduce to an organization in a BYOD 
context.  
The experiment’s results demonstrated that application information is synchronized and stored offsite. 
When the HTC One X was reset to factory settings, the Google applications were reinstalled and 
synchronized with the Google Cloud. A total of 83 activity artifacts were restored to the device and 
recovered from Image 2. This represents nearly 48% of the activity artifacts which were recovered from 
Image 1. Furthermore, this information was only secured by a single username and password. The recent 
attacks on Google (Fletcher, 2010) and Evernote (Forbes Online, 2013), have highlighted that single-sign-
on systems can further complicate BYOD scenarios for corporate organizations.  
Another threat identified in the post-hoc test is the potential for an attacker to hijack a specific account 
without the user being aware they are under attack. When a second device, an HTC Desire was 
synchronized with the same credentials as those on the HTC One X, the device could be used to access all 
the information stored in the Google Cloud while it was still accessible from the One X. There was no 
  
notification from Google that an additional device was accessing the experimental data set. This could 
lead to the following scenarios:  
 Corporate information could be compromised from a ‘piggy-back device’. The organization and 
device owner may be unaware this has occurred; or 
 A victim could use a secondary device primarily used by another individual such as a spouse or 
family member to access corporate information. The secondary device, if stolen or compromised 
could expose residual data to attack; or 
 A victim could be locked out of his/her account causing the device to no longer synchronize with the 
Google Cloud.  
The results of the experiment coupled with these scenarios highlight challenges associated with the 
management and protection of corporate data.  
5.3 Pattern Development  
Mobile location-based services are predominantly used to determine where a mobile device user is 
located. These services are used to not only tell the device user where and how to get to their destination, 
but also to disclose which friends are nearby, what the weather forecast is and what places of interest are 
located nearby (Vaughan-Nichols, 2009). The problem arises when this location information is integrated 
with personal or business information.  
Google currently requires users to sign-in to their Google accounts to use any smartphone application, 
Gmail and any other Google service (Bauer, Bravo-Lillo, Fragkaki, & Melicher, 2013). Google can, 
potentially, assimilate data about an individual’s habits using any of their services with their activities on 
Google+. This integration of information can be dangerous from a high-level pattern recognition 
perspective, particularly in corporate environments.  
However, the amount of information stored in Google applications is of greater concern when lost and/or 
stolen mobile devices, such as smartphones, can be used in social engineering attacks against an 
organization (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008; Landman, 2010; Weippl, Holzinger, & Tjoa, 2006). Should a 
device which has been used for both work and personal use be lost or stolen, there is the potential for the 
device to be ‘rooted’ and the data on the device used for a social engineering attack.  
The artifacts recovered from the pretest and posttest images, in relation to the activities in Table 2 – Daily 
activities and Table 3 – Other activities, indicate that this data can be used to establish high-level device 
data patterns. All of the artifacts from Table 2 and 74% of the artifacts from Table 3 were recovered from 
the pretest image, while 60% of the artifacts from Table 2 and 31% of the artifacts from Table 3 were 
recovered from the posttest image.  The recovery and clustering of timestamps for the activities presented 
in Table 2 suggests that it may be possible to identify high-level blocks of time when an individual is 
typically engaged in some activity. This type of information can be valuable to a social engineering 
attacker who would like to know when the device owner may be away from his/her workstation or office. 
The results from Image 2 (posttest) also indicate that a substantial portion of this data is being stored in 
the cloud. The synchronization of a device, with no personal data, with the Google Cloud retrieved nearly 
48% of the activity artifacts which were recovered from Image 1. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The results of the quasi experiment described in this paper provide preliminary support for both 
hypothesis 1 and 2. Substantial residual data of known user activities were recovered from the pretest and 
posttests, 81% and 39% respectively. The post-hoc test also resulted in a recovery of 39% of known user 
behaviors.   
  
This initial investigation provides a proof of concept that known user behavior can be correlated with 
high-level device data patterns based on data generated from a smartphone using cloud-based 
synchronized apps. The clustering of the timestamps for the activities presented in Table 2 indicates high-
level data patterns are identifiable. The research also indicates that a substantial portion of this data is 
being stored in the cloud. The synchronization of a device with no personal data with the Google Cloud 
retrieved 83 activity artifacts. This represents nearly 48% of the activity artifacts which were recovered 
from Image 1. This finding reinforces the need to investigate security controls to be able to prevent or 
manage information flow between BYOD mobile devices and cloud synchronization services. The 
experiment also highlights a potential hijacking opportunity. A secondary device can be used to login to 
the Google Cloud and synchronized without the victim being aware or notified that this action has 
occurred.  
This study provides a foundation for expanded, richer, more extensive and real-world based datasets for 
individuals and organizations. The data raises additional questions about the discrepancies between data 
extraction methods like the android debug bridge and the Cellebrite extraction tool. These inconsistencies 
should be examined in future studies.  
Future research will investigate the introduction of mobile devices into real-world environments in order 
to track, visualize and compare algorithms designed to de-couple business and personal data. The idea is 
not only to be able to look backward at the static residual data on the device to develop detailed device 
profiles but to be able to investigate effective ways to link individuals to specific device behavior. The 
ultimate goal is to develop algorithms that can link devices to individuals and predict future behavior with 
a high degree of certainty. Success in this area could have positive implications in minimizing the current 
risk associated with BYOD solutions in organizations. Detailed activity profiles created from the 
algorithms could be used to alert security personnel to a suspicious activity. The establishment of metrics 
to determine an organizations’ comfort level with an employee’s mobile device activities could provide 
insight into potential security issues and, potentially, mitigate BYOD concerns for organizations. In 
addition, future work will expand the experiment to include a variety of smartphones and Operating 
Systems (OS). The focus is to evaluate pattern identification and validation across multiple devices and 
OSs. 
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